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A RAWLSIAN PARADIGM CASE
This paper considers the problem of applying a theory of justice,
especially that of Rawls, to appraise the justice of social institutions.
In the first place, one must have a measure of the reasonable expectations
of members of society. The measure proposed in this paper is the Shapley
value of game theory. One can argue on behalf of this measure that it is
consistent both with Rawls' notion of pure procedural justice and with
Rawls' conception of the background institutions of justice. In the second
place, one must have and defend a rule which judges the basic structures of
societies on the basis of the reasonable expectations of their members.
The paradigm case consists of four different basic structures appraised
by six different rules. The major comparison, however, is between Rawls*
Difference Principle and Bentham's utilitarian rule. The main argument
for any rule is that, within a basic structure, it lead to a social
equilibrium, and that the basic structure itself be an equilibrium with
respect to alternative basic structures. Equilibrium in the latter sense
means the absence of revolutionary tendencies. A society which satisfies
the Difference Principle—but not necessarily one which satisfies the
utilitarian rule—achieves such an equilibrium. This then is one sense
in which a social order satisfying the Difference Principle is a rational
social order.
1. The paradigm case to be considered is that of a society whose
members are avid to protect and promote their interests. Different
societies can be imagined; the argument to follow need not work for them.
The paradigm case is framed in such a way that the theory of games applies
to society.
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The members of society shall be referred to as the set N of the first
n Integers. The members of society are held fixed in any comparison of
different social structures. Since the paper does not deal with the
difficult problem of justice between generations, it is best to think of
the members of society as contemporaries of one another. In the Rawlsian
interpretation, the members of society also constitute the assembly in the
Original Position.
2. The strong assumption is made initially that the primary social
goods can be measured by a utility which is transferable. Not only can
the utilities of two individuals be compared, but utility between them can
be transferred by means of the primary social goods. The medium of utility
exchange is best called "money." Relaxing the transferabillty assumption
is possible, but it complicates things considerably. It is far from clear
whether comparability can be relaxed; no attempt in that direction will be
made here.
3. The basic structure of society is "the way in which the major
social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine
the division of advantages from social cooperation." [7, p. 7] Formally,
the basic structure is represented by the function v from the set of subsets
of N to the real numbers. Let S be a logically possible group of members
of society; then v(S) represents the utility which the members of S
collectively can guarantee themselves. Of course, the existence of such
guarantees is predicated upon the legal system, property relations, markets,
and government—In a word, the major social institutions. Thus different
basic structures correspond, in general, to different functions v.
Requiring that v be superaddltive—that is, for any groups S and T
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v(S) + v(T) S v(S U T)
then captures the idea of gains from social cooperation. Other formal
representations of the basic structure are possible, but this one has the
virtue of simplicity.
4. Rawls* Difference Principle belongs to the class of rules which
appraise the justice of societies according to the reasonable expectations
of their members. The essential problem with any such rule is Co get the
data necessary for applying the rule.
Interpersonal comparisons are made in terms of expectations
of primary social goods...! define these expectations simply as
the index of these goods which a representative individual can
look forward to. One man's expectations are greater than another's
if this index for someone in his position is greater. (7, p. 92]
Rawls mentions two difficulties confronting such a comparison;
One problem clearly is the construction of the index itself.
How are the different primary social goods to be weighed? Assuming
Chat the two principles of justice are serially ordered, this
problem is greatly simplified...The only index problem that
concerns us is that for the least advantaged group. [7, p. 93]
Another difficulty is this. It may be objected that
expectations should not be defined as an index of primary goods
anyway but rather as the satisfactions to be expected when plans
are executed using these goods. [7, p. 94]
Now as long as the primary social goods can be measured by a utility which
is transferable, neither of these problems arises. The first problem does
not arise because a single primary social good, money, stands proxy for all;
the second, because utility is synonymous with money. However, the first
problem does arise when utility cannot be transferred by means of money.
In any case, one still faces the problem of forming reasonable expectations,
given the basic structure of society.
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Since the idea of representing the basic structure of society by a real
valued function is due to game theory [6, Chapters 4 & 25], it is natural
to look to game theory for possible measures of reasonable expectation.
The measure of reasonable expectation this paper advances is the Shapley
value of a game [2, Appendix A],
5. The Shapley value is a mathematical operation defined on a game
(N,v), consisting of the members and the basic structure of society. One
finds the Shapley value of a player by computing the expected value of his
marginal contribution in a random ordering of ail the players. The Shapley
value of a game, then, is the vector of the values of the individual players
9ov - ( cpovd). 9ov(2), .... ^ov(n)).
In the case of transferable utility, the Shapley value of a player is a
unique real number.
An example will help clarify the calculation underlying the Shapley
value. Consider a society consisting of three members, with the following
basic structure:
v( ill ) - v{ i2! ) - v( isl ) = 0
v( il,2l ) = 9
v( il,3! ) - 3
v( i2.3i ) - 0
v( ll,2.3l ) - 9
Represented here is a situation with a hypothetical orlgin—no player can
guarantee himself utility—and with gains from cooperation which are not
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distributed uniformly atnofig the players. Indeed, players 2 and 3 do not
gain at all from cooperation; but all other groups do gain from cooperation,
though not to the same extent.
Suppose that a player is paid his marginal contribution to a group
that is, what the group can achieve with him less what the group can achieve
without him. Then a player's marginal contribution depends on what group
he joins. This wealth of possibilities is accounted for by the idea of
a random ordering of society—namely, all the logically possible permutations
of the members of the set N. If one considers all random ordering^ equally
possible, then a player's rational expectation in a social game is the
mathematical expectation of his marginal contribution in a random ordering.
The required calculations for the example are set out in Table I. The
reasoning for the first line of the table is as follows. Since player 1 is
the first to join a coalition, his marginal contribution is 0=v( 11 I);
then player 2 joins player 1, his marginal contribution being 9 = v( 1,2 ) -
v( {1 I ); finally, when player 3 joins players 1 and 2, his marginal
contribution is 0 = v( j 1,2,3 \) - v( j 2,3 j ). This reasoning is then
repeated for each line of the table, and the resulting marginal contributions
are averaged. The Shapley value of the game v, cpov, turns out to be the
vector of utilities (5, 3.5, .5). Thus, player 1 can reasonably expect to
do the best in this society, followed by player 2 and then player 3.
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TABLE I. Calculation of Kcasonable lixpectation (Shapioy Value)
Marginal Marginal Marginal
Random ordering contribution, contribution, contribution,
of players player 1 player 2 player 3
12 3 0 9 0
13 2 0 6 3
2 13 9 0
0
2 3 1 9 0
0
3 12 3 6
0
3 2 1 9 0
0
average marginal contribution, player 1 ™30/6 =5 = 9ov(l)
average marginal contribution, player 2 = 21/6 = 3.5 = 9ov(2)
average marginal contribution, player 3 = 3/6 = .5 = 9ov(3)
6. It is clear that calculating a Shapley value to find one*s
reasonable expectation is not the most obvious thing to do. However, in a
Rawlsian paradigm case, the ideas of pure procedural justice and the back
ground institutions of justice lend some credence to such a calculation.
First consider Rawls* idea of pure procedural justice:
Pure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent
criterion for the right result: instead there is a correct or fair
procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair,
whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly
followed. In order to apply the notion of pure procedural justice
to distributive shares it is necessary to set up and to administer
impartially a just system of institutions. Only against the back
ground of a just basic structure, including a just political
constitution and a just arrangement of economic and social insti
tutions, can one say that the requisite just procedure exists.
[7, pp. 86-7]
In pure procedural justice, then, distributions of advan
tages are not appraised in the first instance by confronting a
stock of benefits available with given desires and needs of
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known individuals. The allotment of the items produced takes place
in accordance with the public system of rules, and this system
determines what is produced, how much is produced, and by what
means. Thus in this kind of procedural justice the correctness
of the distribution is founded on the justice of the scheme of
cooperation from which it arises and on answering the claims of
individuals engaged in it, A distribution cannot be judged in
isolation from the system of which it is the outcome or from what
individuals have done in good faith in the light of established
expectations. If it is asked in the abstract whether one
distribution of a given stock of things to definite individuals
with known desires and preferences is better than another, then
there is simply no answer to this question. The conception of the
two principles does not interpret the primary problem of distribu
tive justice as one of allocative justice. [7, p. 88]
Rawls' notion here is that of a mechanism which, once set in motion, generates
procedurally just distributions. Ruled out are all compensations and
redistributions after the mechanism has worked itself out. In particular,
if the background institutions in fact generate a distribution of primary
social goods equivalent to that given by the Shapley value, then reasonable
expectations have been realized and the Shapley value must correspond to
a purely just procedure.
Consider then Rawls' background institutions of justice;
The ideal scheme sketched in the next several sections makes
considerable use of market arrangements. It is only in this way,
I believe, that the problem of distribution can be handled as a
case of pure procedural justice...At the start I assume that the
regime is a property-owning democracy since this case is likely
to be better known. But, as I have noted, this is not intended
to prejudge the choice of regime in particular cases. [7, p. 274]
This account of distributive shares is simply an elaboration
of the familiar idea that income and wages will be just once a
(workably) competitive price system is properly organized and
embedded in a just basic structure. These conditions are
sufficient. The distribution that results is a case of back
ground justice on the analogy with the outcome of a fair
game. [ 7 , p. 304 ]
Since the decision-makers in the Original Position know the general facts of
social theory, they know that the Shapley value reproduces the distribution
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of income (money, utility) yielded by a perfectly competitive economy.
[ 2,3 ] In pure procedural justice, given the background of institutions
of justice, the price system actually performs the Shapley value calculation,
7. A Rawlsian paradigm case requires that there exist more than one
possible basic structure for society. The paradigm case here will consist
of the basic structure given in //5, hereafter denoted v^, and three others—
Vji, The basic structures of the latter three are as follows;
Group Vjj
1,2( 4 3 2
l,3j 2 2 1.5
2,3] 1 1 .5
1.2,3j 6 5 3
All four basic structures share a hypothetical origin, at which no individual
guarantees himself any utility.
The reasonable expectation for a player in each of these four baislc
structures (recall Table I) is given in Table XI. This is the data that
ultimately enables those in the Original Position to choose a basic structure
for society.
Notice that regardless of which social structure is chosen, player 1
is best off and player 3 is worst off. This fixed inequality in life, one
might say, is due to inequalities in native ability. Different social
structures may frame these inequalities differently, but no social structure
can overturn them. Thus there exists an identifiable leaat-priviliged class,
the same for every possible society. This feature of the paradigm case
proves crucial later on.
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TABLE II. Reasonable expectations
Reasonable Expectation
of society Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
5 3.5 0.5
^11
2.666 2.166 1.166
^iii
2.166 1.666 1.166
>
>
1.416 0.916 0.666
8. There are two choices that can be made in the Original Position:
either choice of a basic structure of society, or choice of a rule for
choosing a basic structure. The second of these choices is the more
fundamental, in the sense that it rationalizes choices of a first kind.
In Rawls theory, for instance, the latter choice comes first in a sequence
of choices. In this paper, attention is restricted to rules for choosing
a basic structure that depend only on the information on reasonable
expectation. The following list of such rules is hardly exhaustive, but
it is suggestive of the inherent possibilities.
Rule 1 (Difference Principle)—v^ is more just than v^^ if and only if
min 9oVj (i) ^ xnin ^ov^^ (i)
i i
This is the choice of rule that Rawls is keen to defend.
Rule 2 (Classical Utilitarianism)—v^ is more just than if and
only if
E %v (i) > S qtov (i)
i i i
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This Is the rule that Rawls sees as the chief coiq}etition for the Difference
Principle, since for fixed K, classical utilitarianism and average
utilitarianism coincide.
Noteworthy is the profound simplicity of these two rules. This
simplicity takes the form of a one-dimensional inference: the judgment
of societies boils down to a single number, measured on a single dimension.
Applying Rule 1 to the paradigm case, one has the ordering: ^III
more just than v_„, more just than v-. The lexical version of Rule 1J J j-
breaks the tie between v^^ and in favor of
By contrast. Rule 2 leads to the ordering: v^ more just than
more just than more Just than
The important disagreement between Rule 1 and 2 in the paradigm case
is that the former finds v^ the least just, while the latter finds v^ the
most just.
Rule 3 (Efficiency)—v^ is more just than v^^ if and only if, for all
i e N,
9ov^ (1) ^ VoVjj (i)
This rule appeals to unanimity for its support. Unlike Rules 1 and 2, it
leads to an incomplete ordering. The only judgment it makes in the paradigm
case is that is more just than Notice that it agrees on this
judgment with both Rule 1 and Rule 2; it is easy to prove that this agree
ment is a general fact. This is a reason for saying that Rule 3 represents
a minimal conception of justice.
The following three rules make interesting contrasts with Rule 1.
Rule 4 (Perfectionism)—v^ is more just than v^^ if and only if
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max ^ov (i) > max "^ov (i)
iL jL ^
Under this rule, the best-off are made as well off as they can be. In the
paradigm case, but not in general. Rule 4 agrees with the judgments of
Rule 2.
Rule 5 (Envy)—Vj. is more just than if and only if
max 9ov (i) max ^ov (i).
i ^11
This rule calls for the bringing down of the best-off. It leads to judgments
exactly opposite of those of Rule 4.
Rule 6 (Misanthropy)—is more just than if and only if
min ^ov^ (i) ^ min 9ov (i).
i i
This rule captures some of the psychology behind "the vice of hating mankind."
It leads to judgments exactly opposite of those of Rule 1.
For easy reference, one may call Rules 1, 4, 5 and 6 the max-min,
min-max, and min-min rules respectively. It is hard to see how either Rule
5 or Rule 6 can be a stable conception of justice; and this may explain
Rawls* neglect of them.
The meaning of these six rules is better grasped by looking at the
choices of social structure which each of them justifies:
Choice of Justified by Rule(s)
Vj 2,3,4,6
1,3
1,3
Viv 5
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There are other conceivable rules—for instance, rules of a statistical
nature or rules that are concerned with the median reasonable expectation-—
but from now on Rules 1 and 2 will occupy the center of attention.
9. This section considers arguments bearing on the choice between Rule
1 and Rule 2, something which any paradigm case calling itself Rawlsian should
be able to do. The main argument for any rule is that it should lead to an
equilibrium situation, both reflectively—those choosing do not regret their
choice—and socially—the social structure and its attendant distribution
of primary social goods are equilibria.
The main argument for Rule 2 runs as follows. Consider two social
structures, only the first of which maximizes the sum of reasonable
expectations. Let (B^, B^) be any distribution of money in the
second social structure. Then there exists a distribution of money
(A^, A^, A^) in the first society such that for every individual i,
A. is greater than B.. Thus one may say that the stability underlying Rule 2
is that of redistributive unanimity. On this argument, Rule 2 contains
within itself a compensation principle, which is hardly surprising in view
of the originators of such principles. [4, 5] However, nothing in the
above argument suggests that the distribution of money ^2' •••»
is an equilibrium distribution. It may require compensations to be paid,
above and beyond the equilibrium. That such compensations will actually
be paid runs counter to the idea of pure procedural justice. There, when
all the social institutions are accounted for and not just the economic
ones, the outcome is what the agents can reasonably expect. In pure
procedural justice, there is no extra mechanism for making redistributions
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after the process has worked itself out. ('omparc this to tlic typical
applications of the compensation principle, where non-economic Institutions
provide just such a mechanism. How convincing counterfactual redistributive
unanimity will be to those in the Original Position must remain a contingent
question. This is a good reason, then, for turning attention to Rule 1.
The argument for Rule 1 is to show how a social equilibrium in the
presence of Rule 1 leads to a reflective equilibrium.
That a distribution of primary social goods within a social structure
is an equilibrium means that there are no forces within the social structure
to upset such a distribution—it is the outcome of all the tendencies
inherent within the system. An example, for a private-ownership economy,
is the competitive equilibrium, at which the forces of demand and supply
are equal in every market. As seen above, in perfect competition such an
equilibrium corresponds to the reasonable expectations of every agent.
Thus, the very framework within which Rule 1 operates—pure procedural
justice—guarantees that the distribution of primary social goods is
itself an equilibrium.
The idea that a basic structure of society is an equilibrium requires
a wider notion of equilibrium, namely, equilibrium with respect to other
basic structures of society. The transformation of one basic structure
of society into another is precisely what is called revolution. Thus,
a basic structure of society is an equilibrium if it is free of revolu
tionary tendencies. The question that arises is whether a basic structure
chosen under Rule 1 is an equilibrium with respect to revolutionary
tendencies.
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Comparing basic structures and the case where Rule 1 and 2
disagree, gives one a better grasp of revolutionary tendency. Now the
reasonable expectations in Table II are taken as representative of those
of members of the high, middle, and low classes, respectively. Suppose
the ruling basic structure is v^. Then the lowest class has a very real
revolutionary incentive—nothing to lose, something to gain by transforming
that basic structure into Even as the lowest class, their situation
is greatly improved. On the other hand, one could assert that v^^ is
vulnerable to the counterrevolutionary tendencies of the middle and
upper classes. As always, the theory of justice presupposes the theory
of the modem state; but in the modern state, it is typically the lowest
class that entertains revolutionary tendencies. As a first approximation,
at least, one is entitled to disregard the counterrevolutionary tendencies
of the higher classes.
Now it is clear that a basic structure chosen by Rule 1 is a full
social equilibrium. The revolutionary class has nothing to gain by
revolution, because for it there exists no revolutionary alternative.
It remains to connect the reasoning for social equilibrium with that
for reflective equilibrium. To this end, it suffices to connect the above
argument with Rawls' argument based on the strains of commitment. The
parties in the Original Position
...consider the strains of commitment. They cannot enter
into agreements that may have consequences they cannot accept.
They will avoid those that they can adhere to only with great
difficulty. [7, p. 176]
In particular, the parties must consider the revolutionary temptation they
will be under if they belong to the lowest class of society, supposing Rule
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1 is not applied. What of the counterrevolutionary strains of commitment?
Here is where Rawis' duty to uphold just institutions enters the argument.
For if parties in the Original Position accept such a duty and choose Rule 1,
then they are coinmiting themselves to resist the temptation of counter
revolutionary tendencies. Thus, the duty to uphold just institutions
expresses in another way the asymmetry between revolution and counter
revolution .
One may say, after Rawls, that "A society's being good is its having
the properties it is rational to want in any society." If it is rational
to want a society which realizes reasonable expectations and resists
revolutionary temptations, then societies satisfying the Difference
Principle are truly good ones. Put a different way, the Difference
Principle proposes a society which is rational when it is actually chosen.
10. Two of the main features of the paradigm case were the trans-
ferability of utility and the existence of a unique least-priviliged class.
It is worth considering how sensitive the results of the paradigm case
are to these features.
When utility is no longer transferable, Rawl's first index number
problem (see page 3) arises. The previous analysis of reasonable expec
tation is considerably complicated. Now it may turn out that the
reasonable expectation of an individual is not a unique number, but a
set of numbers--each attaching to a different competitive price system.
Thus, the one-dimensionality of Rules 1 and 2 is lost: what one is
comparing is no longer a single number, but a set of numbers. The problem
arising with such comparisons is rather tricky and will not be settled
here, since in any event it goes beyond the bounds of a paradigm case.
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When there no longerexlsts a unique least-priviliged class, it need
no longer be the case that a society satisfying the Difference Principle
is one free of revolutionary tendencies. To see this, consider Table III
of the reasonable expectations for the (unspecified) basic structures
Vv. and
TABLE III. Cyclic Reasonable Expectations
reasonable expectation, reasonable expectation, reasonable expectation,
player 1 player 2 player 3
•^v
^VI
3 1 2
2 3 1.1
^11 ^ ^ ^
Of these three basic structures, clearly only satisfies the Difference
Principle. Nevertheless, it is subject to revolutionary temptation on the
part of all classes of society except for the highest class (of which
player 2 is representative). For player 3, both v^ and are revolutionary
alternatives to v^^; for player 1, v^. What makes this possible is the fact
that a different class is least-priviliged in each basic structure. In fact,
the basic structures here form a cycle, just as in Condorcet's paradox of
voting [1, p. 3], The existence of such cycles is the heart of Arrow's
problem of social choice [1, p. 59]; examples like those of Table 3 suggest
that the connection between Arrow's problem and Rawls' problem is closer
than the latter himself believes [7, p. 134], In the last resort, whether
there exists a least-priviliged class common to all basic structures of
society must itself remain an open question.
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